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ABSTRACT
Adversarial training is a training scheme designed to counter adversarial attacks
by augmenting the training dataset with adversarial examples. Surprisingly, sev-
eral studies have observed that loss gradients from adversarially trained DNNs are
visually more interpretable than those from standard DNNs. Although this phe-
nomenon is interesting, there are only few works that have offered an explanation.
In this paper, we attempted to bridge this gap between adversarial robustness and
gradient interpretability. To this end, we identified that loss gradients from ad-
versarially trained DNNs align better with human perception because adversarial
training restricts gradients closer to the image manifold. We then demonstrated
that adversarial training causes loss gradients to be quantitatively meaningful. Fi-
nally, we showed that under the adversarial training framework, there exists an
empirical trade-off between test accuracy and loss gradient interpretability and
proposed two potential approaches to resolving this trade-off.
1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial attack is an imperceptible perturbation to the input image which causes a deep neural
network (DNN) to misclassify the perturbed input image with high confidence (Goodfellow et al.,
2015). Such perturbed inputs are called adversarial examples. Numerous defence approaches have
been proposed to create adversarially robust DNNs that are resistant to adversarial attacks. One
of the most common and successful defence methods is adversarial training, which augments the
training dataset with adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013).
Surprisingly, several studies have observed that loss gradients from adversarially trained DNNs are
visually more interpretable than those from standard DNNs, i.e., DNN trained on natural images
(Ross & Doshi-Velez, 2018; Tsipras et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019). These studies have used the
visual interpretability of gradients as evidence that adversarial training causes DNNs to learn mean-
ingful feature representations which align well with salient data characteristics or human perception.
However, asking whether gradient visualization is meaningful to a human may be entirely different
from determining whether it is an accurate description of the internal representation of the DNN. For
instance, consider the DNN decision interpretation methods Deconvolution (Zeiler & Fergus, 2014)
and Guided Backpropagation (Springenberg et al., 2015). They visualize the importance of each
input pixel in the DNN decision process with heat maps produced by calculating imputed versions
of the gradient. Although they produce sharp visualizations, they have been proven to be doing
partial image recovery which is unrelated to DNN decisions (Nie et al., 2018).
∗This work was done while Beomsu Kim was an intern at SI Analytics.
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In light of such studies, judging the interpretability of a DNN with the visual quality of its loss gra-
dient runs the risk of being incorrect. There have been few attempts to analyze adversarial training
in the context of DNN interpretability. For example, Chalasani et al. (2018) have investigated the
effect of adversarial training on network weights. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no work which provides thorough analyses of the effect of adversarial training on the visual and
quantitative interpretability of DNN loss gradients.
In this paper, we attempted to bridge this gap between adversarial robustness and gradient inter-
pretability through a series of experiments that addresses the following questions:1 “why do loss
gradients from adversarially trained networks align better with human perception?”, “is there a re-
lation between the strength of adversary used for training and the perceptual quality of gradients?”
and most importantly, “does adversarial training really cause loss gradients to better reflect the in-
ternal representation of the DNN?”. We then ended the paper by identifying a trade-off between
test accuracy and gradient interpretability and proposing two potential approaches to resolving this
trade-off. Specifically, we have the following three contributions:
1. Visual Interpretability. We showed that loss gradients from adversarially trained networks
align better with human perception because adversarial training causes loss gradients to lie
closer to the image manifold. We also provided a conjecture for this phenomenon and
showed its plausibility with a toy dataset.
2. Quantitative Interpretability. We showed that loss gradients from adversarially trained
networks are quantitatively meaningful. To this end, we established a formal framework
for quantifying how accurately gradients reflect the internal representation of the DNN.
We then verified whether gradients from adversarially trained networks are quantitatively
meaningful using this framework.
3. Accuracy and Interpretability Trade-off. We showed with CNNs trained on CIFAR-10
that under the adversarial training framework, there exists an empirical trade-off between
test accuracy and loss gradient interpretability. Then based on the experiment results, we
proposed two potential approaches to resolving this trade-off.
2 VISUAL INTERPRETABILITY OF LOSS GRADIENTS
We start by answering why adversarially trained DNNs have loss gradients that align better with
human perception. All experiment settings in this paper can be found in the Appendix.
2.1 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING CONFINES GRADIENT TO IMAGE MANIFOLD
To identify why adversarial training enhances the perceptual quality of loss gradients, we hypoth-
esized adversarial examples from adversarially trained networks lie closer to the image manifold.
Note that the loss gradient is the difference between the original image and the adversarial image.
Hence if the adversarial image lies closer to the image manifold, the loss gradient should align better
with human perception.
Following previous works Tsipras et al. (2018) and Stutz et al. (2018), we first trained DNNs against
adversarial attacks which maximize the training loss / cross entropy (XEnt) loss or the CW surrogate
objective proposed by Carlini & Wagner (2017). These objectives are maximized using Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) (Kurakin et al., 2016) such that the adversarial examples stay within `2 or
`∞-distance of  from the original image. We say an adversary, or an adversarial attack is stronger
if its  is larger. For consistency of observations, we trained the DNNs on three datasets: MNIST
(LeCun et al., 1998), FMNIST (Xiao et al., 2017) and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009).
Specific adversarial training procedures are described in Appendix B.1.
Then, we trained a VAE-GAN (Larsen et al., 2016) on each dataset. Using its encoder enc and
decoder dec, we projected an image or an adversarial example x to the approximated manifold by
pi(x) = dec(enc(x)).2 Next, we computed dpi(x) = ‖x− pi(x)‖2 to quantify how close x is to the
1All codes for the experiments in this paper are public on
https://github.com/1202kbs/Robustness-and-Interpretability.
2 We can also define the projection as pi(x) = dec(z∗) where z∗ = argminz ‖x − dec(z)‖2, but either
definition led to the same results.
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(a) MNIST
(b) FMMNIST
(c) CIFAR-10
Figure 1: Distributions of dpi of adversarial examples for standard and adversarially trained DNNs.
We also show distributions of dpi of test images for reference. The subcaptions indicate the dataset
used. The adversaries that the DNNs trained against are denoted in legend by norm,  and objective.
Best viewed in electronic format (zoomed in).
image manifold. Note that this concept of using a generative model to obtain an image’s projection
to the manifold has also been applied frequently in the context of adversarial defense (Song et al.,
2017; Meng & Chen, 2017; Samangoeui et al., 2018).
Figure 1 compares distributions of dpi for the test images and their adversarial examples from stan-
dard or adversarially trained DNNs. We only analyzed `2-bounded attacks maximizing the XEnt
loss since `2-bounded attacks represent the original direction of the loss gradient while `∞-bounded
attacks modify the gradient through clipping. Attacks which failed to change the prediction are
removed since they are likely to be zero matrices due loss function saturation.
It can be observed from Figure 1 that, for all datasets, adversarial examples for adversarially trained
DNNs lie closer to the image manifold than those for standard DNNs. This suggests adversarial
training restricts loss gradients to the image manifold. Hence gradients from adversarially trained
DNNs are more visually interpretable. Interestingly, it can also be observed that using stronger
attacks during training reduces the distance between adversarial examples and their projections even
further. That is, the adversarial examples from more robust DNNs look more natural, as shown in
Figure 2. We now provide a conjecture for these phenomena.
2.2 A CONJECTURE UNDER THE BOUNDARY TILTING PERSPECTIVE
In this section, we propose a conjecture for why adversarial training confines the gradient to the
manifold. Our conjecture is based on the boundary tilting perspective on the phenomenon of ad-
versarial examples (Tanay & Griffin, 2016). Figure 3a illustrates the boundary tilting perspective.
Adversarial examples exist because the decision boundary of a standard DNN is “tilted” along direc-
tions of low variance in the data (standard decision boundary). Under certain situations, the decision
boundary will lie close to the data such that a small perturbation directed toward the boundary will
cause the data to cross the boundary. Moreover, since the decision boundary is tilted, the perturbed
data will leave the image manifold.
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Figure 2: Visualization of adversarial examples for standard and adversarially trained DNNs. The
adversaries that the DNNs trained against are denoted in the figure title by norm,  and objective.
(a) Illustration of the boundary tilting per-
spective.
(b) Results on a 2-dimensional toy dataset.
Figure 3: (a) An illustration of the boundary tilting perspective. Each arrow indicates adversarial
perturbation against the decision boundary of corresponding color. (b) Experiment results on a 2-
dimensional toy dataset. The blue and red regions indicate points where the network classified as
class 1 and class 2. The adversarial attacks are taken against points in class 2. The bottom left and
right figures show the instances where the network is trained against a weak and strong adversary.
Under the boundary tilting perspective and observations of Section 2.1, we present a new conjec-
ture on the relationship between adversarial training and visual interpretability of loss gradients:
adversarial training removes tilting along directions of low variance in the data (robust decision
boundary). Intuitively, this makes sense because a network is robust when only large- attacks are
able to cause a nontrivial drop in accuracy, and this happens when data points of different classes
are mirror images of each other with respect to the decision boundary. Since the loss gradient is
generally perpendicular to the decision boundary, it will be confined to the image manifold and thus
adversarial examples stay within the image manifold.
As a sanity check, we tested our conjecture with a 2-dimensional toy dataset. Specifically, we trained
three two-layer ReLU network to classify points from two distinct bivariate Gaussian distributions.
The first network is trained on original data and the latter two networks are trained against weak
and strong adversaries. We then compared the resulting decision boundaries and the distribution of
adversarial examples. Specific adversarial training procedures are described in Appendix B.2.
The training data and the results are shown in Figure 3b. The decision boundary of the standard
network is tilted along directions of low variance in the data. Naturally, the adversarial examples
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leave the data manifold. On the other hand, adversarial training removes the tilt. Hence adversarial
perturbations move data points to the manifold of the other class. We also observed training against
a stronger adversary removes the tilt to a larger degree. This causes adversarial examples to align
better with the data manifold. Hence the decision boundary tilting perspective may also account
for why adversarial training with stronger attack reduces the distance between an adversarial exam-
ple and its projection even further (Figure 1). We leave more theoretical justification and deeper
experimental validation of our observations and hypothesis for future work.
If our conjecture is true, adversarial training prevents the decision boundary from tilting. Hence
adversarial examples are restricted to the image manifold and thus loss gradients align better with
human perception. However, as we have discussed in Section 1, visual sharpness of gradients do not
imply that they accurately represent the features learned by the DNN. We address this issue in the
next section by quantitatively evaluating the interpretability of loss gradients.
3 INTERPRETABILITY OF ADVERSARIALLY TRAINED NETWORKS
To the best of our knowledge, there are no works on quantifying the interpretability of loss gradients.
However, quantitative interpretability of logit gradients and its variants have been thoroughly studied
in the context of attribution methods (Bach et al., 2015; Samek et al., 2017; Adebayo et al., 2018;
Hooker et al., 2018).3 Since the loss gradient highlights the input features which affect the loss most
strongly, and thus are important for the DNN’s prediction, we may also treat it as an attribution
method. This allows us to extend the reasoning and techniques in works on attribution method
evaluation to the loss gradient.4
3.1 FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
We denote vectors or vector-valued functions by boldface letters. Let F ,G andM denote families
of DNNs, attribution methods and attribution method evaluation metrics. A DNN f ∈ F maps an
image x ∈ Rd to a vector of class logits y ∈ RC , where d is the input dimension and C is the
number of classes. Then an attribution method g ∈ G maps the tuple (f ,x) to a vector of attribution
scores a ∈ Rd. Finally, an attribution method evaluation metric µ ∈ M assigns to each tuple (f ,g)
a scalar indicating how accurately g reflects the internal representation of f . A higher value of µ
indicates that the attribution method better describes the internal representation of the DNN.
Here, note that the value of µ depends on both f and g. Previous works have focused on improving
the value of µ for fixed f by developing better and more complex g (Bach et al., 2015; Sundararajan
et al., 2017; Smilkov et al., 2017; Shrikumar et al., 2017). However, we can also improve the value
of µ for fixed g by varying f through changing the network topology, training scheme, etc. It is only
recently that the latter approach have started to receive attention. In the next section, we investigate
this approach in the context of adversarial training.
3.2 EFFECT OF ADVERSARIAL TRAINING ON LOSS GRADIENT INTERPRETABILITY
Here we experimentally evaluate whether loss gradients from adversarially trained DNNs are truly
more interpretable than those from standard DNNs. Using the definitions from the previous section,
we can rephrase this goal as follows: Let FStd be the family of standard DNNs and let FAdv
be the family of adversarially trained DNNs, all of the same architecture. Given an attribution
method g ∈ G, we want to verify whether minf∈FAdv µ(f ,g) > maxf∈FStd µ(f ,g). In particular,
we are interested in the case when g(f ,x) = ∇xJ where J is the XEnt loss. We denote this
attribution method by gG. We also evaluate a variant Gradient ∗ Input (Shrikumar et al., 2017):
g(f ,x) = x∇xJ . We denote Gradient ∗ Input using the XEnt loss by gGX .
3Attribution methods are DNN decision interpretation methods which assign a signed attribution value to
each input feature (pixel). An attribution value quantifies the amount of influence of the corresponding feature
on the final decision. Since each pixel is assigned an attribution value, we can visualize the attributions by
arranging them to have the same shape as the input.
4Since the loss gradient is a linear combination of logit gradients, we can reasonably expect most observa-
tions for loss gradients to hold for logit gradients as well (and vice versa). However, loss gradients have the
nice property of being generally perpendicular to the decision boundary, and this gives us more insights such
as Section 2.2. Hence we have chosen to examine loss gradients, not logit gradients.
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Figure 4: Effect of adversarial training on interpretability of gG and gGX . The x-axis indicates 
(attack strength) used during training. The values of  are scaled into [0, 1] such that `2-bounded
attacks and `∞-bounded attacks are comparable. Note that  = 0 is standard training. The y-axis
indicates quantitative interpretability, as explained in the text. We also show the linear correlation
coefficient and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for each combination of adversarial training
setting (norm and objective) and attribution method (G for gG and GX for gGX ).
We quantified the interpretability of each methods via two attribution method evaluation metrics
Remove and Retrain (ROAR) and Keep and Retrain (KAR) (Hooker et al., 2018). Specifically, we
measured how the performance of the classifier changed as features were occluded based on the or-
dering assigned by the attribution method. For ROAR, we replaced a fraction of all CIFAR-10 pixels
estimated to be most important with a constant value. For KAR, we replaced the pixels estimated to
be least important. We then retrained a CNN on the modified dataset and measured the change in test
accuracy. We trained three CNNs per attribution method for each fraction {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}
and measured test accuracy as the average of these three CNNs.
Since ROAR removes most important input features, a better attribution method should cause more
accuracy degradation. Conversely, since KAR removes least important features, a better attribu-
tion method should cause less accuracy degradation. For reference, we also evaluated the random
baseline gRand which assigns random attribution values to input features. We then defined the
interpretability scores under ROAR and KAR by
µROAR(f ,g) = (Area over curve (AOC) of the ROAR curve for g)− (AOC for gRand),
µKAR(f ,g) = (Area under curve (AUC) of the KAR curve for g)− (AUC for gRand).
Figure 4 shows the values of µROAR and µKAR for each adversarial training setting. Specific ad-
versarial training procedures are described in Appendix B.3. First, we observed that there is a strong
positive correlation between the strength of attack used during adversarial training and interpretabil-
ity with the exception of gG from `2-trained DNNs in KAR. This result is significant because it
shows adversarial training indeed causes the gradient to better reflect the internal representation of
the DNN. It implies that training with an appropriate “interpretability regularizer” may be enough to
produce DNNs that can be interpreted with simple attribution methods such as gradient or Gradient
∗ Input. However, it does not imply we no longer need to develop complex attribution methods
to interpret DNNs. This topic will be dealt with further in Section 3.3, in the context of trade-off
between accuracy and loss gradient interpretability.
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Figure 5: Relation between test accuracy and interpretability of gG and gGX under the adversarial
training framework. The x-axis indicates test accuracy on natural images. The y-axis indicates
quantitative interpretability, as explained in the text. We also show the linear correlation coefficient
and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for each combination of adversarial training setting
(norm and objective) and attribution method (G for gG and GX for gGX ).
We also observed Gradient ∗ Input performs better than the loss gradient. We believe this is because
the former method is a global attribution method while the latter is a local attribution method.5
Since both ROAR and KAR evaluate attribution methods based on feature occlusion, Gradient ∗
Input should theoretically show better performance.
Finally, we remark that if our conjecture in Section 2.2 is true, there may be a close connection
between gradient interpretability and the degree to which gradient is confined to the data manifold.
In other words, DNNs with less tilted decision boundaries may yield loss gradients that are more
visually and quantitatively meaningful.
3.3 ACCURACY AND LOSS GRADIENT INTERPRETABILITY TRADE-OFF
Previous works have observed that there may be a trade-off between accuracy and adversarial ro-
bustness (Tsipras et al., 2018; Su et al., 2018). As we have shown in the previous section, there
exists a positive correlation between the strength of adversarial attack used in the training process
and gradient interpretability. Hence it is highly likely that there exists a negative correlation between
network accuracy and gradient interpretability. To verify this, we trained CNNs on CIFAR-10 un-
der various adversarial attack settings and evaluated their gradient interpretability. More detailed
experiments setting used in this subsection can be found in Appendix B.3.
Figure 5 shows the relation between test accuracy and loss gradient interpretability. Indeed, there
is a near-monotonic decreasing relation between interpretability and accuracy under both ROAR
and KAR. We note that the only exception of this trend is gG from `2-trained DNNs in KAR.
5Local attribution methods return vectors that maximize the value which the attribution is taken with respect
to. On the other hand, global attribution methods visualize the marginal effect of each feature on that value. For
further details on the difference between local and global attribution methods, we refer the readers to Section
3.2 of Ancona et al. (2018).
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(a) MNIST (b) FMNIST (c) CIFAR-10
Figure 6: Visualization of the loss gradient for standard and adversarially trained DNNs. To display
the gradients, we summed up the gradients along the color channel and then capped low outlying
values to 0.5th percentile and high outlying values to 99.5th percentile.
These results imply that adversarial training itself is not a perfect method for attaining gradient
interpretability without sacrificing test accuracy.
We also observed that attributions from `2-trained networks are more resistant to this trade-off in
ROAR. On the other hand, attributions from `∞-trained networks were more resistant in KAR. This
implies attributions from `2-trained DNNs are more effective at emphasizing important features
while attributions from `∞-trained DNNs are better at identifying less important features. This is
somewhat consistent with the visual characteristics of loss gradients: as shown in Figure 6, gra-
dients from `∞-trained networks are very sparse but discontinuous while gradients from `2-trained
networks are smooth but less sparse. Analyzing the effect of norm used to constrain the adversary on
the neural network’s decision boundary and the gradient may also be an interesting line of research.
From the results, we see two potential approaches to resolving this trade-off. First, since the global
attribution method gGX performs better than the local attribution method gG, we can explore com-
binations of adversarial training with other global attribution methods such as Layer-wise Relevance
Propagation (Bach et al., 2015), DeepLIFT (Shrikumar et al., 2017) or Integrated Gradient (Sun-
dararajan et al., 2017). Second, since there is large performance gain in using `∞-training over
`2-training in KAR while there is only slight gain in using `2-training over `∞-training in ROAR,
we can seek better ways of applying `∞-training.
4 CONCLUSION
Adversarial training is a training scheme designed to counter adversarial attacks by augmenting the
training dataset with adversarial examples. Surprisingly, several studies have observed that loss
gradients from adversarially trained DNNs are visually more interpretable than those from DNNs
trained on natural images. Although this phenomenon is interesting, there are only few works that
have offered an explanation. In this paper, we attempted to bridge this gap between adversarial
robustness and gradient interpretability. To this end, we identified that loss gradients from adver-
sarially trained DNNs align better with human perception because adversarial training restricts loss
gradients closer to the image manifold. We also provided a conjecture for this phenomenon and ver-
ified its plausibility with a toy dataset. We then demonstrated that adversarial training indeed causes
gradients to be quantitatively meaningful with two attribution method evaluation metrics. Finally,
we showed with CNNs trained on CIFAR-10 that under the adversarial training framework, there
exists an empirical trade-off between test accuracy and gradient interpretability. Then based on the
experiment results, we proposed two potential approaches to resolving this trade-off.
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A EXPERIMENT SETTINGS
A.1 DATASETS
The toy dataset is comprised two classes. Each class consists of 3000 points sampled from a bivariate
Gaussian distribution. The first distribution has mean and covariance matrix
µ =
[
1.2
0.1
]
, Σ =
[
0.1 −0.01
−0.01 0.0002
]
.
The second distribution has µ = [1.2, 0.1]T and the same covariance matrix. All four datasets toy
dataset, MNIST, FMNIST and CIFAR-10 were normalized into range [−1, 1].
A.2 CLASSIFICATION NETWORKS
We trained all the models with Adam with default settings α = 0.001, β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999.
For the toy dataset, we trained a two-layer ReLU DNN for 10 epochs to achieve 100% test accuracy.
For MNIST and FMNIST, we trained a ReLU CNN for 5 epochs to achieve 98.6% and 90.6% test
accuracy, respectively. For CIFAR-10, we trained a ReLU CNN for 20 epochs to achieve 73.6% test
accuracy. The architectures for the classification models are given in the tables below. For dense
layers, we write “Dense (number of units)”. For convolution layers, we write “Conv 2D (filter size,
stride, number of filters)”. For max-pooling layers, we write “Max-pooling (window size, stride)”.
Toy Dataset DNN
Dense (128) ReLU
Dense (2)
MNIST / FMNIST CNN
Conv 2D (5× 5, 1, 64) ReLU
Conv 2D (5× 5, 1, 32) ReLU
Max-pooling (2× 2, 2)
Dense (1024) ReLU
Dense (10)
CIFAR-10 CNN
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 32) ReLU
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 32) ReLU
Max-pooling (2× 2, 2)
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 64) ReLU
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 64) ReLU
Max-pooling (2× 2, 2)
Dense (256) ReLU
Dense (10)
A.3 VAE-GANS
We used a common encoder structure for MNIST, FMNIST and CIFAR-10. We set the latent dimen-
sion zdim = 10 for MNIST and FMNIST and zdim = 128 for CIFAR-10. In contrast to Larsen
et al. (2016), for the reconstruction loss, we use the `1 distance, not the discriminator’s features. The
architectures for VAE-GANs are given in the tables below. We reuse the notation for classification
networks. Additionally, BN indicates batch normalization and for transposed convolution layers, we
write “Deconv 2D (filter size, stride, number of filters)”.
Encoder
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 64) BN ReLU
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 128) BN ReLU
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 256) BN ReLU
Dense (zdim ∗ 2) BN
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MNIST / FMNIST. We used the decoder and discriminator structure given in Larsen et al. (2016).
We trained the network with Adam with learning rate α = 0.0005, β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.999 and 1
discriminator update per encoder and decoder update for 30 epochs for MNIST and 60 epochs for
FMNIST.
Decoder
Dense (1024) BN ReLU
Deconv 2D (4× 4, 2, 256) BN ReLU
Deconv 2D (4× 4, 1, 128) BN ReLU
Deconv 2D (4× 4, 2, 32) BN ReLU
Deconv 2D (4× 4, 2, 1) TanH
Discriminator
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 32) ReLU
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 128) BN ReLU
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 256) BN ReLU
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 256) BN ReLU
Dense (512) BN ReLU
Dense (1) Sigmoid
CIFAR-10. We used the decoder and discriminator structure given in Miyato et al. (2018). In the
discriminator, we used spectral normalization (SN) with leaky ReLU (lReLU) activation functions
with slopes set to 0.1. We trained the network with Adam learning rate α = 0.0002, β1 = 0,
β2 = 0.9 and 5 discriminator updates per encoder and decoder update for 150 epochs.
Decoder
Dense (8192)
Deconv 2D (4× 4, 2, 256) BN ReLU
Deconv 2D (4× 4, 2, 128) BN ReLU
Deconv 2D (4× 4, 2, 64) BN ReLU
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 3) TanH
Discriminator
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 64) SN lReLU
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 64) SN lReLU
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 128) SN lReLU
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 128) SN lReLU
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 256) SN lReLU
Conv 2D (4× 4, 2, 256) SN lReLU
Conv 2D (3× 3, 1, 512) SN lReLU
Dense (1) Sigmoid
B ADVERSARIAL ATTACK AND ADVERSARIAL TRAINING SETTINGS
All adversarial attacks in this paper were optimized to maximize the cross entropy loss or the CW
surrogate objective with 40 iterations of PGD. Following previous works Tsipras et al. (2018) and
Stutz et al. (2018), during adversarial training, we trained on adversarial images only. That is, we did
not mix natural and adversarial images. We describe the adversarial training procedure and attack
settings used in each section.
B.1 SECTION 2.1.
For MNIST and FMNIST, we trained DNNs against `2-bounded attacks with  ∈ {1, 2, 4} and `∞-
bounded attacks with  ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2}. For CIFAR-10, we trained DNNs against `2-bounded
attacks with  ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 1.6} and `∞-bounded attacks with  ∈ {0.005, 0.01, 0.02}. The adver-
sarial examples used for analysis are `2-bounded attacks with  = 12 which maximize the cross
entropy loss.
B.2 SECTION 2.2.
We trained the networks against `2-bounded attacks with  = 0.25 (weak) and  = 0.5 (strong). We
visualized `2-bounded attacks with  = 1 which maximize the cross entropy loss.
B.3 SECTIONS 3.2 AND 3.3.
We trained DNNs against `2 or `∞-bounded attacks of varying . For `2-bounded attacks, we lin-
early interpolated  between 0 and 1.6 with step size 0.08. For `∞-bounded attacks, we linearly
interpolated  between 0 and 0.4 with step size 0.002.
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